According to reliable surveys, strong majorities in America, England, and Iraq favor a timetable for the rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. U.S. soldiers are dying and being wounded in a cause their countrymen view as a mistake. A majority of Iraqis believe taking up arms against U.S. troops is justified. The war may cost one trillion in American tax dollars in the long-term. The “coalition of the willing” has been reduced to a “coalition of the coerced”, with Italian troops the latest to announce their withdrawal.

The Iraq war has become unsustainable, even if it may be theoretically “winnable” with another decade of killing and dying. Ignoring the democratic mandates of the people of the U.S., U.K. and Iraq will only deepen a crisis of constitutional authority and leave deep scars on all three countries, most horrifically on Iraq.

Our political leadership clearly needs assistance in extricating itself not only from Iraq but from the paralyzing politics of blame at home. Otherwise the conflict can be continued from one administration to the next, with no president able politically to withdraw. In that scenario, more Americans will die needlessly in an unwinnable war, and Iraq will plague our society through the 2008 elections and beyond.

The independent advisory panel may play a key role in charting an exit strategy that brings our troops home, is acceptable to both our political parties and to the majority of Americans. These reflections are offered with that face-saving possibility in mind.

PROPOSALS FOR AN EXIT STRATEGY

1. The U.S. government, quietly if necessary, should support those parliamentarians and leaders in Iraq already demanding a timeline for either beginning and/or completing U.S. troop withdrawals in the near-term. Known to some strategists as “the Philippines option”, this plan would have the Iraqi government invite the Americans to withdraw and end the occupation. By this year’s end, the Iraqis and the U.S. could jointly request that the United Nations Security Council end its authorization of the present occupation and the international community take responsibility for contributing to the security and reconstruction of Iraq. In such a scenario, the U.S. could claim credit for removing Saddam Hussein from power and fostering a constitutional process endorsed by Iraqis. At the same time, Iraqi nationalists could claim the end of foreign occupation. With proper diplomacy, the armed resistance could suspend or reduce its violence in response to the American withdrawal, just as they did for several days during the Iraqi elections earlier this year.

Under Iraq’s constitution, re-authorization of the United Nations mandate must be requested by a majority of Iraq’s parliament before December 2006. One hundred thirty eight “aye” votes are needed. In September, 104 MP’s signed a letter calling for a U.S. timetable for withdrawal, a step that was ignored by the Iraqi executive, the U.S. Embassy, the White House and the American media. According to my sources, 138 votes could be achieved easily, especially if the parliamentarians believe their call would be heeded.

Of course, such a sharp change in U.S. policy would be opposed vigorously by those whose status and power rests on the American occupation. They should receive generous offers of support if they are willing to play constructive roles in the new Iraq. But it is unacceptable to mortgage U.S. policy to the perpetuation of the tenure of a small clique widely seen as collaborators.

Obviously, another alternative, already wildly rumored in Baghdad, would be a peaceful coup d’etat, bringing a new interim administration to power during the transition period. Iraqi opponents of the occupation are already in contact with the Pentagon seeking neutrality towards such a coup.

2. The announcement of a U.S. withdrawal timetable should be integrated an invitation for engagement by the international community, a proposal described as “U.S. out, U.N. in.” The declared U.S. intention to withdraw troops, expressed in a timetable of no more than one year, will trigger the engagement of the international community of necessity, to avoid an unpredicatable power vacuum. The United Nations could authorize a multi-layered peace and development conference to consider security, reconciliation, economic development, and funding arrangements for a postwar Iraq. The key actors besides the Iraqis and the Americans would be the Arab League, Iran, the European Union, other Islamic states, Russia and China. This would require a diplomatic peace offensive, direct and/or indirect, by the United States, especially towards Syria and Iran in a mutual effort at stability through security guarantees for Sunni and Shiite communities in Iraq. It is perhaps too much to hope for, but a parallel effort at brokering creation of a viable Palestinian state, and the end of the Israeli occupation, would be a powerful signal to most Iraqis and their regional allies.

3. The U.S. should appoint a peace envoy to signal its shift from a military model to one of conflict resolution. Appointed by the President with the approval of Congress, the envoy [or envoys such as the present chairs of the Iraqi Study Group] would serve as honest brokers in ending the current occupation and facilitating a peace and reconstruction process among Iraqis, beginning immediately and continuing for several years. The experiences of South Africa, Northern Ireland and the Dayton talks might serve as models to draw on during this multi-year process. The core principles of conflict resolution should include, but not be limited to:

a. preserving Iraq as a unitary state, not trying to forcibly impose partition on the armed resistance and nationalists.

b. Developing equitable power-sharing formulas for the distribution of oil revenues and representation in the Iraqi state.

c. Restoring the majority of Baathists to professional and military positions, especially in protecting Sunni interests.

d. Creating confidence-building measures and concrete steps to encourage the militias to adopt cease-fires and begin Northern Ireland-style discussions of long-term decommissioning of offensive weapons in their hands.

In the best of all worlds, the process of U.S. military withdrawal and the engagement of the international community in a diplomatic offensive would be synchronized to occur in the same timeframe.

The task of peace envoy cannot be left to the Secretary of State alone because it is more than a full-time job. At the same time, the envoy should enjoy the full confidence of the President, the cabinet secretaries, the Congressional leadership and, to the extent possible, the regional parties to the conflict.

KEY QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED

1. What to do about al-Qaeda? Without any doubt, their popular support and base of recruitment within Iraq would diminish instead of growing. They could be confronted militarily by the Iraqis themselves, but more likely would claim “victory”, maintain a base in western Iraq, and deploy to other battlefronts. Security risks to the U.S. would not be increased in any of these scenarios.

2. Will there be a bloodbath after the U.S. leaves? No one can predict with certainty but the U.S. military operation and occupation guarantees a continuing, and perhaps increasing, bloodbath. The withdrawal of occupation forces is likely to diminish the present levels of violence, but only if accompanied by the diplomacy, political reform, security and reconstruction guarantees already proposed.

As to the prospect of civil war, it must be understood that the present sectarian violence arose as a result of the U.S. intervention. Now that the Sunni Arabs in particular have been displaced from their previous status, the seeds of serious conflict including vengeance killings will remain. The task is to guarantee revenues, power-sharing, and the return of ex-Baathist security forces to the Sunni regions while recognizing the existence of a Shiite majority and quasi-autonomous Kurdish area. Trying to stop a civil war through greater military force by a foreign power is a proven failure.

The US forces led 95,000 house-to-house searches during the current campaign in Baghdad, antagonizing vast numbers of Iraqis. The solution being proposed to the present failure in Baghdad is only more of the same.

3.What about redeployments, partial withdrawals or an over-the-hill strike force? The task of the advisory panel is to chart the most responsible strategy for exiting Iraq. Partial withdrawals might become the worst of all worlds. Trying to leave a U.S. strike force in Kurdistan, Kuwait, the Persian Gulf or “over the hill” may be justified to raise the comfort level of Americans and our allies in the region. But it must be understood as part of an exit strategy, not a force that can emerge from the wings to re-occupy Iraq.

4.And what about partitioning the country? This is a perilous strategy favored by those with ethnic, economic, or strategic stakes in a sub-divided Iraq. Certainly the conflict resolution process must address the sectarian divides that have arisen with occupation and the displacement of the previous Sunni dominance. But carving up Iraq is not necessary to these ends. It is a feel-good proposal which guarantees continued suffering and war, for two reasons: first, cities like Baghdad and even Basra are multi-ethnic in makeup, so partition would require forced resettlement for millions of Iraqis and, second, partition could only be achieved by the military defeat of Iraqi nationalists, both Sunni and Shiite.

In conclusion, let me suggest that the advisory panel expand the present spectrum of scenarios being considered in Iraq, to include the worst-case one. At present, it is assumed that America can either “stay the course” or gradually withdraw our troops them in increments, at a time of our own choosing, while searching for a political solution acceptable to ourselves. But these scenarios are based on confident assumptions that American troops can be deployed for several years if necessary. In the worst-case scenario, however, the strategic balance is tipping towards the Iraq insurgency, which means time is not on our side. The longer America postpones a decisive commitment to withdraw militarily and engage diplomatically, the more it becomes possible that the Iraqi government and security forces will be defeated in the western provinces and perhaps Baghdad itself. If the Green Zone implodes and Iraqi army forces defect by the thousands, the token five thousand British troops now in Basra and the south will be assaulted next. The scenario I would urge you to keep in mind is South Vietnam 1975, not the occupations of Germany and Korea sixty years ago. In short, our troops and our country are living on borrowed time, not an indefinite pass to enjoy permanent power over decisions that belong to Iraqis. The more swiftly we act, the more swiftly America will repair its over-extended security forces, its budget priorities, its public confidence in the democratic process, and our battered image in the world. #

TOM HAYDEN teaches at Pitzer College in Claremont, California. He has extensive experience in conflict resolution. During the 1960s he opposed the Vietnam war, negotiated the release of American prisoners, and was an intermediary between parties to the Paris Peace Talks. In 1967, he directly negotiated the withdrawal of state troops from the Newark, New Jersey, ghetto. During the Northern Ireland war, he spent ten years engaged in the peace process, including a role as adviser to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. As a state senator, he sponsored cease-fire talks between rival gangs that ended a killing spree in Culver City and Santa Monica.. Since 2003, he has written and published extensively on the Iraq crisis, making three trips to Amman and London to interview representatives of all Iraq’s major parties and opposition groups. He is credited with prompting the first ad hoc House hearing on exit strategies from Iraq, in 2005. He has written several books regarding conflict resolution, including Street Wars, Irish on the Inside, and The Zapatista Reader.